Posts tagged with psychology

English predominantly talks about time as if it were horizontal, while Mandarin … commonly describes time as vertical.

Lera BoroditskyDoes Language Shape Thought?: Mandarin and English Speakers’ Conceptions of Time

 

see also

  • Jenn-Yeu ChenDo Chinese and English speakers think about time differently? Failure of replicating Boroditsky (2001)
    By estimating the frequency of usage, we found that Chinese speakers actually use the horizontal spatial metaphors more often than the vertical metaphors.




This is a question about argument, counterargument, convincing people of something, and why people believe the things they do.

  • Let’s say you make a claim. For example the claim that rich people are rich because they do the most good in society.
  • I want to argue that you’re wrong. There are a couple ways I could proceed.
  • Now, to me, personally, the most logical tack to take should be to ask you for evidence.
    Wikipedian Protester

    You’ve made a sweeping claim about a large number of people, using ill-defined abstractions like "good", and so on.
  • In my mind, the way I personally think, I should ask you to back that up, you won’t be able to (or will make recourse to doctors, neglecting the real issues like LBO investors or the bottom billion) and then you end as wrong or neutral.
  • But. This is not what really works in a real debate or argument. It’s mysterious to me as to why, but I think a correct answer as to why would be pure gold.
  • What’s going to work better is if I argue a separate theory.  Like "No, the rich don’t benefit society the most, they just screw people over the most. They put the terms of trade in their favour, they set up deals that screw over powerless or uninformed parties, and the game is set up in a way that benefits them.” If I’m really impassioned and present some stories backing up my viewpoint this will work even better.
  • Now to me this seems illogical. You’re saying "X" and rather than responding "Not X" I’m supposed to respond "Y". Y relates somewhat to X and kind-of negates X, but mostly Y is just a different theory of the world.
  • Another example could be that you argue for supply-side economics. Instead of me arguing against supply-side economics, pointing out the flaws or weak points in it, it’s more convincing if I argue Keynesianism, or MMT, or some other full theory, instead.

My examples are economics debates because I’m stupid. But this principle of arguing in a different direction than directly contrary to what you say works elsewhere too.

  • Look up "Gish Gallop" for example. The phrase relates to evolutionists complaining about the way a creationist, Duane Gish, argues. Gish allegedly adds more and more propositions to his argument, forcing his opponent to look up and refute stuff much slower than Gish can add new propositions.
  • Gish is not arguing this way, and his evolutionist opponents are not frustrated by the rhetorical style, because it doesn’t work. Irrespective of how much he does it, the fact that evolutionists were bothered enough to name a “fallacy" after Duane Gish indicates that audiences were swayed by the technique of adding more and more propositions.
  • Logically—to me at least—it’s harder to prove a claim made up of many propositions than to prove just one of the propositions making up the claim. So “Not only does G-d exist, but the Christian G-d exists, and was made manifest as Jesus Christ, and died on the cross to atone for the sins of mankind, and ten other points of doctrine" —- should be harder to prove than just "Any G-d exists”. But yet I’ve seen more than one “Atheism debate” where the anti-atheist person debates this very long proposition.
  • Or let’s say you’re arguing that a thesis you read in the Times is “probably right" because it’s vetted by experts. I should argue back that vetting doesn’t imply it’s right. But to be more convincing, I probably should counter the Times writer’s theory with one of my own. If I don’t have one, but just like to carry around a bucket of scepticism to pour on fires of passion? I’m SOL rhetorically.
  • Why wouldn’t you just defend the easiest argument—the one that Pareto-dominates the long argument?
  • The fact that people don’t agree with what I’m calling simple logic means I’m missing something. In fact I don’t think anyone has a theory of why people are convinced by things, which captures the appeal of these run-on arguments. Of course I would be happy to be told I’m wrong about that; please tell me if I am.
  • Do people prefer more information-dense statements? Does making a more specific claim imply, in some wider "ecological" sense, that the speaker is “more likely to be” well-informed? Do people prefer whole frameworks to piecemeal facts? If so, why?
  • I could go on with more questions and half-baked theories of what might be happening, but I’ll spare you.

So, why do people think this way? Is it a lack of sfumato? And what does the fact that people think this way tell us about other important stuff, like rationality, love relationships, parenting, reasoning, good decisionmaking, "facts", habits, authority, marketing, judgement, court convictions, investing/retirement planning, political voting, how people come to their beliefs, and what it takes to change someone’s beliefs?




The Cartesian products
{−,+} ⨉ {−,+}
and
 {−,+,0} ⨉ {−,+,0}
realised as faces and as theories of personality.

Isomorphic to what you get if you strip the lightswitch group of its relationships=mappings=arrows (forgetful functor →Set).

The Five Temperaments apparently thinks the Four Humours theory of personality is improved by adding 0. We could go all the way to fuzzy logic and make the dimension continuous. What would that do?

hi-res




Another interesting space.




Eros and Magic in the Renaissance took magic seriously as a system of psychological manipulation that used the cravings and desires of its target—the “eros” of the title—to shape human behavior. It suggested on that basis that modern advertising, which does exactly this, is simply the current form of magic, and that contemporary Western nations are “magician states” governed by the magical manipulation of public consensus.

None of these ideas were new. [Ioan] Culianu got most of them from the same place he got much of his magical training, the writings of the renegade Dominican sorcerer Giordano Bruno, who ended a colorful career by being burnt at the stake for heresy in 1600. Bruno’s writings on magic describe magic in much the same way Culianu did, as a system of manipulation that casts out lures for nonrational desires.
John Michael Greer, Grand Archdruid of the Ancient Order of Druids in America

(Source: thearchdruidreport.blogspot.com)




Conversation topics on Facebook by age.

hi-res




Murray Gell-Mann became annoyed with Richard Feynman

  • generating anecdotes or stories about himself
  • not brushing his teeth
  • not washing hands after urinating
  • "You’re just a salesman type. You’re just a normal person, not an independent thinker."
  • purposefully cultivated outsider image. Feynman, you hipster!

(por Muon Ray)




Lucas’ “rational expectations” revolution in macroeconomics has been tied to the ending of stagflation in the world’s largest economy, and to the reintroduction of “psychology” into finance and economics. However, I never felt like the models of “expectation” I’ve seen in economics seem like my own personal experience of living in ignorance. I’d like to share the sketch of an idea that feels more lifelike to me.

http://www.olivierlanglois.net/images/voro2.jpg

First, let me disambiguate: the unfortunate term-overlap with “statistical expectation” (= mean = average = total over count = ∑ᵢᴺ•/N = a map from N dimensions to 1 dimension) indicates nothing psychological whatever. It doesn’t even correspond to “What you should expect”.

If I find out someone is a white non-Hispanic Estadounidense (somehow not getting any hints of which state, which race, which accent, which social class, which career track…so it’s an artificial scenario), I shouldn’t “expect” the family to be worth $630,000. I “expect” (if indeed my expectation is not a distribution but rather just one number) them to be worth $155,000. (scroll down to green)

Nor, if I go to a casino with 99% chance of losing €10,000 and 1% chance of winning €1,000,000 (remember the break-even point is €990,000). “On average” this is a great bet. But that ignores convergence to the average, which would be slow. I’d need to play this game a lot to get the statistics working in my favour, and I mightn’t stay solvent (I’d need to get tens of millions of AUM—with lockdown conditions—to even consider this game). No, the “statistical expectation” refers to a long-run or wide-space convergence number. Not “what’s typical”.

Not only is the statistical expectation quite reductive, it doesn’t resemble what I’ve introspected about uncertainty, information, disinformation, beliefs, and expectations in my life.

File:Coloured Voronoi 3D slice.svg

A better idea, I think, comes from the definition of Riemann integration over 2+ dimensions. Imagine covering a surface with a coarse mesh. The mesh partitions the surface. A scalar is assigned to each of the interior regions inscribed by the mesh. The mesh is then refined (no lines taken away, only some more added—so some regions get smaller/more precise and no regions get larger/less precise), new scalars are computed with more precise information about the scalar field on the surface.
a scalar field

NB: The usual Expectation operator 𝔼 is little more than an integral over “possibilities” (whatever that means!).

(In the definitions of Riemann integral I’ve seen the mesh is square, but Voronoi pictures look awesomer & more suggestive of topological generality. Plus I’m not going to be talking about infinitary convergence—no one ever becomes fully knowledgeable of everything—so why do I need the convenience of squares?)

I want to make two changes to the Riemannian-integral mesh.

image
image

 

First I’d like to replace the scalars with some more general kind of fibre. Let’s say a bundle of words and associations.

(You can tell a lot about someone’s perspective fro the words they use. I’ll have to link up “Obverse Words”, which has been in my drafts folder for over a year, once I finish it—but you can imagine examples of people using words with opposite connotation to denote the same thing, indicating their attitude toward the thing.)

http://i780.photobucket.com/albums/yy90/AlexMLeo/felixsbrain.jpg

Second, I’d like to use the topology or covering maps to encode the ignorance somehow. In my example below: at a certain point I knew “Rails goes with Ruby” and “Django goes with Python” and “Git goes with Github” but didn’t really understand the lay of the land. I didn’t know about git’s competitors, that you can host your own github, that Github has competitors, the more complex relationship between ruby and python (it’s not just two disjoint sets), and so on.

When I didn’t know about Economics or Business or Accounting or Finance, I classed them all together. But now they’re so clearly very very different. I don’t even see Historical Economists or Bayesian Econometricians or Instrumental Econometricians or Dynamical Macroeconomists or Monetary Economists or Development Economists as being very alike. (Which must imply that my perspective has narrowed relative to everyone else! Like tattoo artists and yogi masters and poppy farmers must all be quite different to the entire class of Economists—and look even from my words how much coarse generalisation I use to describe the non-econ’s versus refinement among the econ’s.
image
These meshes can have a negative curvature (with, perhaps a memory) if you like. You know when you think that property actuaries are nothing at all like health actuaries that your frame-of-reference has become very refined among actuary-distinguishment. Which might mean a coarse partitioning of all the other people! Like Bobby Fischer’s use of the term “weakies” for any non-chess player—they must all be the same! Or at least they’re the same to me.)

image

Besides the natural embedding of negatively-curved judgment grids, here are some more pluses to the “refinement regions” view of ignorance:

  1. You could derive a natural “conservation law” using some combination of e.g. ability, difficulty, how good your teachers are, and time input to learning, how many “refinements” you get to make. No one can know everything.

    (Yet somehow we all are supposed to function in a global economy together—how do we figure out how to fit ourselves together efficiently?

    And what if people use your lack of perspective to suggest you should pay them to teach you something which “evaluates to valuable” from your coarse refinement, but upon closer inspection, doesn’t integrate to valuable?)
  2. Maybe this can relate to the story of Tony—how we’re always in a state of ignorance even as we choose what to become less ignorant about. It would be nice to be able to model the fact that one can’t escape one’s biases or context or history.
  3. And we could get a fairly nice representation of “incompatible perspectives”. If the topology of your covering maps is “very hard” to match up to mine because you speak dialectics and power structures but I speak equilibria and optima, that sounds like an accurate depiction. Or when you talk to someone who’s just so noobish in something you’re so expert in, it can feel like a very blanket statement over so many refinements that you don’t want to generalise over (and from “looking up to” an expert it can also feel like they “see” much more detail of the interesting landscape.)
  4. Ignorance of one’s own ignorance is already baked into the pie! As is the beginner’s luck. If I “integrate over the regions” to get my expected value of a certain coarse region, my uninformed answer may have a lot of correctness to it. At the same time, the topological restrictions mean that my information and my perspective on it aren’t “over there” in some L2-distance sense, rather they’re far away in a more appropriately incompatible-with-others sense.

In conclusion, I’m sure everyone on Earth can agree that this is a Really Nifty and Cool Idea.

File:ApproximateVoronoiDiagram.png

 

I’ll try to give a colourful example using computers and internet stuff since that’s an area I’ve learned a lot more about over the past couple years.

A tiny portion of Doug Hofstadter’s “semantic network”.  via jewcrew728, structure of entropy

First, what does ignorance sound like?

  • (someone who has never seen or interacted with a computer—let’s say from a non-technological society or a non-computery elderly rich person. I’ve never personally seen this)
  • "Sure, programming, I know a little about that. A little HMTL, sure!”
  • "Well, of course any programming you’re going to be doing, whether it’s for mobile or desktop, is going to use HTML. The question is how.

OK, but I wasn’t that bad. In workplaces I’ve been the person to ask about computers. I even briefly worked in I.T. But the distance from “normal people” (no computer knowledge) to me seems very small now compared to the distance between me and people who really know what’s up.

A few years ago, when I started seriously thinking about trying to make some kind of internet company (sorry, I refuse to use the word “startup” because it’s perverted), I considered myself a “power user” of computers. I used keyboard shortcuts, I downloaded and played with lots of programs, I had taken a C++ course in the 90’s, I knew about C:\progra~1 and how to get to the hidden files in the App packages on a Mac.

My knowledge of internet business was a scatty array of:

  • Mark Zuckerberg
  • "venture capital"
  • programer kid internet millionaires
  • Kayak.com — very nice interface!
  • perl.
    Regular Expressions
    11th Grade
  • mIRC
  • TechCrunch
  • There seem to be way more programming going on to impress other programmers than to make the stuff I wanted!
  • I had used Windows, Mac, and Linux (!! Linux! Dang I must be good)
  • I knew that “Java and Javascript are alike the way car and carpet are alike”—but didn’t know a bit of either language.
  • I used Alpine to check my gmail. That’s a lot of confusing settings to configure! And plus I’m checking email in text mode, which is not only faster but also way more cooly nerdy sexy screeny.
  • Object-Oriented, that’s some kind of important thing. Some languages are Object-Oriented and some aren’t.
  • "Python is for science; Ruby is for web"
  • sudo apt-get install
    Sandwich
  • I had run at least a few programs from the command line.
  • I had done a PHP tutorial at W3CSchools … that counts as “knowing a little PHP”, right?

So I knew I didn’t know everything, but it was very hard to quantify how much I did know, how far I had to go.

image

A mediocre picture of some things I knew about at various levels. It’s supposed to get across a more refined knowledge of, for example, econometrics, than of programming. Programming is lumped in with Linux and rich programmer kids and “that kind of stuff” (a coarse mesh). But statistical things have a much richer set of vocabulary and, if I could draw the topology better, refined “personal categories” those words belong to.

Which is why it’s easier to “quantify” my lack of knowledge by simply listing words from the neighbourhood of my state of knowledge.

Unfortunately, knowing how long a project should take and its chances of success or potential pitfalls, is crucial to making an organised plan to complete it. “If you have no port of destination, there is no favourable wind”. (Then again, no adverse wind either. But in an entropic environment—with more ways to screw up than to succeed—turning the Rubik’s cube randomly won’t help you at all. Your “ship” might run out of supplies, or the backers murder you, etc.)

File:2Ddim-L2norm-10site.png

Here are some of the words I learned early on (and many more refinements since then):

  • Rails
  • Django
  • IronPython
  • Jython
  • JSLint
  • MVC
  • Agile
  • STL
  • pointers
  • data structures
  • frameworks
  • SDK’s
  • Apache
  • /etc/.httpd
  • Hadoop
  • regex
  • nginx
  • memcached
  • JVM
  • RVM
  • vi, emacs
  • sed, awk
  • gdb
  • screen
  • tcl/tk, cocoa, gtk, ncurses
  • GPG keys
  • ppa’s
  • lspci
  • decorators
  • virtual functions
  • ~/.bashrc, ~/.bash_profile, ~/.profile
  • echo $SHELL, echo $PATH
  • "scripting languages"
  • "automagically"
  • sprintf
  • xargs
  • strptime, strftime
  • dynamic allocation
  • parser, linker, lexer
  • /env, /usr, /dev,/sbin
  • GRUB, LILO
  • virtual consoles
  • Xorg
  • cron
  • ssh, X forwarding
  • UDP
  • CNAME, A record
  • LLVM
  • curl.haxx.se
  • the difference between jQuery and JSON (they’re not even the same kind of thing, despite the “J” actually referring to Javascript in both cases)
  • OAuth2
  • XSALT, XPath, XML

http://www.financialiceberg.com/uploads/iceberg340.jpg
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/content_images/fig/1100190504002.png


http://www.preventa.ca/images/im_risk_anatomy.jpg

This is only—as they say—“the tip of the iceberg”. I didn’t know a ton of server admin stuff. I didn’t understand that libraries and frameworks are super crucial to real-world programming. (Imagine if you “knew English” but had a vocabulary of 1,000 words. Except libraries and frameworks are even better than a large vocabulary because they actually do work for you. You don’t need to “learn all the vocabulary” to use it—just enough words to call the library’s much larger program that, say, writes to the screen, or scrapes from the web, or does machine learning, for you.)

The path should go something like: at first knowing programming languages ⊃ ruby. Then knowing programming languages ⊃ ruby ⊃ rubinius, groovy, JRuby. At some point uncovering topological connections (neighbourhood relationships) to other things (a comparison to node.js; a comparison to perl; a lack of comparability to machine learning; etc.)

I could make some analogies to maths as well. I think there are some identifiable points across some broad range of individuals’ progress in mathematics, such as:

  • when you learn about distributions and realise this is so much better than single numbers!

    a rug plot or carpet plot is like a barcode on the bottom of your plot to show the marginal (one-dimension only) distribution of data

    who is faster, men or women?
  • when you learn about Gaussians and see them everywhere
    Central Limit Theorem  A nice illustration of the Central Limit Theorem by convolution.in R:  Heaviside <- function(x) {      ifelse(x>0,1,0) }HH <- convolve( Heaviside(x), rev(Heaviside(x)),        type = "open"   )HHHH <- convolve(HH, rev(HH),   type = "open"   )HHHHHHHH <- convolve(HHHH, rev(HHHH),   type = "open"   )etc.  What I really like about this dimostrazione is that it’s not a proof, rather an experiment carried out on a computer.  This empiricism is especially cool since the Bell Curve, 80/20 Rule, etc, have become such a religion.NERD NOTE:  Which weapon is better, a 1d10 longsword, or a 2d4 oaken staff? Sometimes the damage is written as 1-10 longsword and 2-8 quarterstaff. However, these ranges disregard the greater likelihood of the quarterstaff scoring 4,5,6 damage than 1,2,7,8. The longsword’s distribution 1d10 ~Uniform[1,10], while 2d4 looks like a Λ.  (To see this another way, think of the combinatorics.)
  • when you learn that Gaussians are not actually everywhere
    kernel density plot of Oxford boys' heights.

    histogram of Oxford boys' heights, drawn with ggplot.A (bimodal) probability distribution with distinct mean, median, and mode.
  • in talking about probability and randomness, you get stuck on discussions of “what is true randomness?” “Does randomness come from quantum mechanics?” and such whilst ignorant of stochastic processes and probability distributions in general.
  • (not saying the more refined understanding is the better place to be!)
  • A brilliant fellow (who now works for Google) was describing his past ignorance to us one time. He remembered the moment he realised “Space could be discrete! Wait, what if spacetime is discrete?!?!?! I am a genius and the first person who has ever thought of this!!!!” Humility often comes with the refinement.
  • when you start understanding symbols like ∫ , ‖•‖, {x | p} — there might be a point at which chalkboards full of multiple integrals look like the pinnacle of mathematical smartness—
    http://www.niemanlab.org/images/math-formula-chalkboard.jpg
  • but then, notice how real mathematicians’ chalkboards in their offices never contain a restatement of Physics 103!
    Kirby topology 2012
    http://whatsonmyblackboard.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/21june2011.jpg
    A parsimonious statement like “a local ring is regular iff its  global dimension is finite” is so, so much higher on the maths ladder than a tortuous sequence of u-substitutions.
  • and so on … I’m sure I’ve tipped my hand well enough all over isomorphismes.tumblr.com that those who have a more refined knowledge can place me on the path. (eg it’s clear that I don’t understand sheaves or topoi but I expect they hold some awesome perspectives.) And it’s no judgment because everyone has to go through some “lower” levels to get to “higher” levels. It’s not a race and no one’s born with the infinite knowledge.
 

I think you’ll agree with me here: the more one learns, the more one finds out how little one knows. One can’t leave one’s context or have knowledge one doesn’t have. And all choices are embedded in this framework.




When we do something in a default style acquired unconsciously, it is like typing on the only typewriter we have ever known: we do not notice the style of our activity any more than we notice the typeface on the machine. In such cases, we have an abstract concept of action that leaves style out of account.

We can have a concept of lying without being aware…that, in practice, we must have a style of lying. We can have a concept of quarreling without being aware…that in practice, we must have a style of quarreling.
from Clear and Simple as the Truth by Francis-Noël Thomas & Mark Turner (via untilasinglesolitonsurvives)




Another reason for economists to take a close look at inequality, social rank, envy, greed, dreams, social or cultural messages/expectations, and so on as determinants of experienced utility.

Sapolsky’s observation is that human beings engage evolutionary stress hormones in response to purely psychological stimuli. Looking at babboons, who cause each other stress as we do, he finds that lower ranked (submissive) males carry higher amounts of epinephrine (adrenalin) and glucocorticoids than dominant alpha males. (No reports in this documentary on fat-shaming or that ugly females have higher stress.)

So that may be a basis for thinking that social inequality—where a rank and a distance exist—really does mean a lower quality of life for the bottom-rungers, even if they have an absolutely high standard of living. (Sapolsky remarks that in the park he visits, food is so plentiful for the babboons that they only need to work 3 hours a day to survive. So they could be said to have an absolutely high wealth.)

Of course the “right” use of Pareto optimality always took into account the possibility that giving more money to Bill Gates could make me more miserable—but utility is so hard to pin down that a social-optimality conversation can easily be turned by “Well, it’s wrong of you to envy the rich” — casting aside the normative/descriptive distinction.

My first thoughts leap to envy-free solutions of pie-splitting problems (S J Bram, P C Fischburn)

image image image image

but maybe there are some free-lunch alternatives as well. Such as, is there something I’m doing that makes other people feel ashamed or stressed? Some subtle pitches to my voice or subtle movements of my eyes when I’m internally judging someone but trying to not say anything out loud? Why do I care anyway if some hippie wants to be an organic farmer and not get a job? I don’t think I even have a good reason to care; “ideological opposition”. Maybe you can make some arguments sometimes that I should be stressed about the possibility that my government gets overrun by a bunch of irresponsible ideologues and it’s worth the time to debate about it. Fine, but still maybe there are some free lunches in just not socially shaming other people. Just because I have more money doesn’t mean I need to look down on you as less a person. There certainly are narratives that tell that story—"Contribution to society" type narratives or "Hard work" narratives and sometimes even Smart narratives. But I don’t need to embrace those, especially if it’s suboptimal.

 

Minute 28 they show pictures of monkey brains lighting up in the pleasure centre or stress zones.

image

Making me think again of taking an integral of the chemical flows over someone’s life (how to deal with time I don’t know) as some kind of selfish evaluation of the pain/pleasure experienced over the lifetime. The naïvest thing would be to measure dopamine and integrate it up over time, perhaps convolved with a risk preference function, anti-variance or pro-variance preference, and some time preference (either NPV/Ramsey or work hard in youth for a delightful old age). Something more realistic would have to take into account that a full life should experience a variety of emotions and corresponding chemical combinations. When your father dies you don’t want to go on smiling and partying, for example.

  

Minute 48 we get Sapolsky’s interpretation: rank isn’t necessarily it, but rather what rank means in your culture. And our own psychological freedom to decide which hierarchy we think is important. Maybe, RS. Just because I have free will doesn’t make me Herculean, it depends how hard it is to override the bad thoughts with self-affirming thoughts.

Giving rather than receiving. Ask a middle-class parent if s/he is looking forward more to giving something to their child or receiving a present from a friend, partner, or coworker this Christmas? Yet the economics 101 just takes consumption and leisure as life’s desiderata.

So put this together with Daniel Kahneman's supposed finding of an “enough” level (around $45k for Americans I think) above which extra income doesn’t add very much to one’s sense of well-being.

That is, above $45k suponemos que income sea more of a ranking tool or a “You did right” reward. People’s happiness se determine más por the way coworkers and people around them act toward them [do I have to deal with this stressful person today? Does Mr Z laugh at my jokes? Do people look and speak to me as if I’m respectable, smart, admirable, good-looking, sexy, competent, fun, nice—what kind of person am I? Am I good?

image

] y menos por consumption por sí. Their home is comfortable enough, their food is good enough, life is easy enough. Money removes discomfort rather than providing happiness, kind of idea.

Hat tip @ArcAldebaran.