Posts tagged with manifolds
We relate a category of models A to a category of more realistic objects B which the models approximate. For example polyhedra can approximate smooth shapes in the infinite limit…. In Borsuk’s geometric shape theory, A is the homotopy category of finite polyhedra, and B is the homotopy category of compact metric spaces.
—-Jean-Marc Cordier and Timothy Porter, Shape Theory
(I rearranged their words liberally but the substance is theirs.)
prod( factorial( 1/ 1:10e4) ) to see the volume of Hilbert’s cube → 0.
It was the high zenith of autumn’s colour.
We drove her car out to the countryside, to an orchard. Whatever the opposite of monocropping is, that’s how the owners had arranged things.
The apple trees shared their slopey hillside with unproductive bushes, tall grasses, and ducks in a small pond in the land’s lazy bottom.
Barefoot I felt the trimmed grass with my toes. A mother pulled her daughter away from the milkweeds—teeming with milkweed nymphs—because “They’re dangerous”.
It was only walking along the uneven ground between orchard and forest that I realised that I almost never walk on surfaces that aren’t totally flat, level, hard, and constant.
and in sheaf theory things can be different around different localities.
The cave walls in Chauvet have been locally deformed even to the point that knobs protrude from them—and the 32,000-year-old artist utilised these as well.
Maybe when Robert Ghrist gets his message to the civil engineers, we too will have a bump-tolerant—even bump-loving—future ahead of us.
M. C. Escher’s painting Ascending and Descending illustrates a non-conservative vector field, impossibly made…. In reality, the height above the ground is a scalar potential field [the scalar (single number attached to a point) being the height above the ground]. If one returns to the same horizontal place, one has gone up exactly as much as one goes down.
So that’s that picture related to
Conservative vector fields obey the product rule:
conservative scalar field is also the output of a derivative operation…just a different dimensionality)
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In the case of Islamic law شريعة the Hadith and the Qu’ran contain some examples of what’s right and wrong, but obviously don’t cover every case.
This leaves it up to jurist philosophers to figure out what’s G-d’s underlying message, from a sparse sample of data. If this sounds to you like Nyquist-Shannon sampling, you and I are on the same wavelength! (ha, ha)
Evenly-spaced samples mapping from a straight line to scalars could be figured out by these two famous geniuses, but the effort of interpreting the law has taken armies of (good to) great minds over centuries.
The example from this episode of In Our Time is the prohibition on grape wine:
The jurists face the big
N problem—many features to explain, less data than desirable to draw on.
Clearly the reason why cases A, B, or D are argued to connect to the known parameter from the Hadith matters quite a lot. Just like in common-law legal figuring, and just like the basis matters in functional data analysis. (Fits nicely how the “basis for your reasoning” and “basis of a function space” coincide in the same word!) .
Think about just two famous functional bases:
Even polynomials look like a
∩ ͡ ; odd polynomials look at wide range like a
/ (you know how
x³ looks: a small kink in the centre ՜𝀱 but in broad distances like /), and sinusoidal functions look like
So imagine I have observations for a few nearby points—say three near the origin. Maybe I could fit a /, or a 𝀱, a 〰, or a ‿.
All three might fit locally—so we could agree that
The basis-function story also matches how a seemingly unrelated datum (or argument) far away in the connected space could impinge on something close to your own concerns.
If I newly interpret some far-away datum and thereby prove that the basis functions are not 〰 but 𝀨𝀱/, then that changes the basis function (changes the method of extrapolation) near where you are as well. Just so a change in hermeneutic reasoning or justification strategy could sweep through changes throughout the connected space of legal or moral quandaries.
This has to be one of the oldest uses of logic and consistency—a bunch of people trying to puzzle out what a sacred text means, how its lessons should be applied to new questions, and applying lots of brainpower to “small data”. Of course disputes need to have rules of order and points of view need to be internally consistent, if the situation is a lot of fallible people trying to consensually interpret infallible source data. Yet hermeneutics predates Frege by millennia—so maybe Russell was wrong to say we presently owe our logical debt to him.
In the law I could replace the mathematician’s “Let” or “Suppose” or “Consider”, with various legalistic reasons for taking the law at face value. Either it is Scripture and therefore infallible, or it has been agreed by some other process such as parliamentary, and isn’t to be questioned during this phase of the discussion. To me this sounds exactly like the hypothetico-deductive method that’s usually attributed to scientific logic. According to Einstein, the hypothetico-deductive method was Euclid’s “killer app” that opened the door to eventual mathematical and technological progress. If jurisprudence shares this feature and the two are analogous like I am suggesting, that’s another blow against the popular science/religion divide, wherein the former earns all of the logic, technology, and progress, and the latter gets superstition and Dark Ages.